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Cohan: Torture and the Necessity Doctrine

Articles
TORTURE AND THE NECESSITY DOCTRINE
John Alan Cohan∗
Imagine that you are creating a fabric of human destiny with
the object of making men happy in the end, giving them peace
and rest at last, but that it was essential and inevitable to
torture to death only one tiny creature—that baby beating its
breast with its fist, for instance—and to found that edifice on
its unavenged tears, would you consent to be the architect on
those conditions? Tell me, and tell the truth.1
I. INTRODUCTION
The use of torture undertaken to obtain information to prevent an
imminent terrorist attack has been the focus of much scholarly work.
Much of the extensive commentary on this subject has alluded to the
necessity doctrine as justification for torturing a suspect who likely has
information concerning a “ticking bomb,” but there has been little
elaboration on just how the necessity doctrine would work in this
context.2
∗

J.D., Loyola Law School, magna cum laude, 1972; B.A., University of Southern
California, 1969. Mr. Cohan was a law clerk to the Hon. Charles H. Carr, United States
District Court Judge for the Central District of California, and an adjunct professor at
Western State University School of Law. He has written numerous articles in law review
publications and philosophy journals. Mr. Cohan’s current research encompasses the areas
of international law, philosophy of society, environmental law, criminal law, and
jurisprudence.
1
FYDOR DOSTOYEVSKY, THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV 291 (Constance Garnett, trans.,
Vintage Books 1955).
2
See, e.g., Julie Angell, Ethics, Torture, and Marginal Memoranda at the DOJ Office of Legal
Counsel, l8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 557 (2005); Mirko Bagaric & Julie Clarke, Not Enough
Official Torture in the World? The Circumstances in Which Torture Is Morally Justifiable, 39
U.S.F. L. REV. 581, 588-89 (2005); Richard B. Bilder & Detlev F. Vagts, Speaking Law to Power:
Lawyers and Torture, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 689 (2004); John Cornyn, In Defense of Alberto R.
Gonzales and the l949 Geneva Conventions, 9 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 213 (2005); Alan M.
Dershowitz, The Torture Warrant: A Response to Professor Strauss, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 275
(2003-04) [hereinafter Dershowitz, The Torture Warrant]; Oswaldo A. Estrada, Human
Dignity and the Convention Against Torture: Has the Burden of Proof Become Heavier than
Originally Intended?, 3 REGENT J. INT’L L. 87 (2005); Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Torture,
Necessity, and the Union of Law & Philosophy, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 183 (2004); Oren Gross, Are
Torture Warrants Warranted? Pragmatic Absolutism and Official Disobedience, 88 MINN. L. REV.
1481 (2004); Linda M. Keller, Is Truth Serum Torture?, 20 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 521 (2005);
Harold Hojgju Koh, A World Without Torture, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 641 (2005);
Sanford Levinson, Ticking Bombs and Catastrophes, 8 GREEN BAG 3ll (2005); David Luban,
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This Article starts from the empirical observation that no other
practice except slavery is so universally condemned in law and human
convention as torture. While ethicists all agree that torture is morally
repugnant, there are competing theories—utilitarianism and
deontology—on just how that should play out in the world.3
The deontological claim is that torture is categorically wrong under
any circumstances because of its intrinsic affront to human decency and
dignity. If there is anything meaningful in the concept “human rights,”
then the right of the individual not to be subjected to torture is so
fundamental that it cannot be derogated even in extreme circumstances.
There has, at least until recently, been the tendency to assume that the
deontological prohibition of torture presents few conceptual or ethical
problems. The opposing view, which is examined in this Article, is that
there are utilitarian “exceptions” that would allow torture in certain
circumstances, even while acknowledging that the practice is morally
repugnant.
First, this Article examines the deontological and utilitarian ideas
behind the use of torture. Its goal is to provide a solution to the dilemma
between deontology and utilitarianism through the common law
doctrine of necessity.
In particular, this Article considers the
underpinnings of the prohibition against torture in international law and
how this has developed in recent years. After a brief overview of the
definition of torture, referring to various international documents, the
Article will briefly explore the controversial Justice Department
memoranda of 2002 and 2004 that suggested a certain leeway in the
definition of torture. Then, this Article turns to an analysis of the
Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, 91 VA. L. REV. 1425 (2005); Andrew A. Moher, The
Lesser of Two Evils? An Argument for Judicially Sanctioned Torture in a Post-9/11 World, 26 T.
JEFFERSON L. REV. 469 (2004); Jason R. Odeshoo, Truth or Dare?: Terrorism and “Truth Serum”
in the Post-9/11 World, 57 STAN. L. REV. 209 (2004); Adam Raviv, Torture and Justification:
Defending the Indefensible, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 135, 151-53 (2004); Louis-Philippe F.
Rouillard, Misinterpreting the Prohibition of Torture Under International Law: The Office of Legal
Counsel Memorandum, 21 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 9 (2005); Louis Michael Seidman, Torture’s
Truth, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 881 (2005); Elizabeth S. Silker, Terrorists, Interrogation, and Torture:
Where Do We Draw the Line?, 31 J. LEGIS. 191 (2004).
3
The most important proponent of deontological moral theory in Western thought is
undoubtedly Immanuel Kant. See IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF
MORALS (Cambridge Univ. Press 1991). For a contemporary account, see, e.g., ROBERT
NOZICK, ANARCHY STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974). Important proponents of utilitarianism (or,
more generally, consequentialism) include Jeremy Bentham, (see JEREMY BENTHAM, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart
eds., Univ. of London 1970)) and John Stuart Mill (see J. S. MILL, UTILITARIANISM (Roger
Crisp ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1999)).
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“ticking bomb” case developed by Alan Dershowitz, and discusses his
salient justifications. As fantastic as the situation might seem, it raises
fundamental issues for consideration and helps us evaluate the moral
principles associated with torture and the necessity doctrine.
Next, the Article explains the underpinnings of the necessity
doctrine, its various elements, and the application of those elements to
the ticking bomb case. The Article touches upon the deployment of
torture by the French against Algerians and the Israelis against
Palestinian detainees. Finally, this Article concludes that while the moral
objections to torture are potent, these arguments are not persuasive
when the stakes are high enough.
II. DEONTOLOGICAL AND UTILITARIAN IDEAS CONCERNING THE USE OF
TORTURE
Deontological ethical theories hold that certain moral rules that
govern the most important aspects of how we ought to live our lives
have no exceptions. Deontology claims that it is impermissible to violate
these rules even though better consequences would result. Many of
these moral constraints are also laws that, for the most part, admit of no
exceptions.
There is always a dilemma with deontological constraints because,
on the one hand, there may be a greater good produced in violating the
constraint and, on the other hand, the constraint is a way to protect the
dignity and liberty of the individual whose rights are at issue. The
tension is between a categorical imperative and social utility, between
rights and interests, and between absolutism and consequentialism.
On the utilitarian side, a number of commentators believe that in a
post-September 11 world, the use of torture is permissible, or indeed
justifiable, in extreme situations to obtain information for investigative
purposes.4 The use of torture, under this view, would be justifiable in
See Marcy Strauss, Torture, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 201, 227 (2003-04). No less a civil
libertarian than Justice Thurgood Marshall said in a dissent:
[T]he public’s safety can be perfectly well protected without abridging
the Fifth Amendment. If a bomb is about to explode or the public is
otherwise imminently imperiled, the police are free to interrogate
suspects without advising them of their constitutional rights. . . . If
trickery is necessary to protect the public, then the police may trick a
suspect into confessing. . . . All the Fifth Amendment forbids is the
introduction of coerced statements at trial.
New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 686 (1984).

4
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the war against terrorism as a last resort “when there is no alternative
and when hundreds, thousands, potentially hundreds of thousands of
lives hang in the balance . . . .”5 The argument is that “methods of
interrogation that normally would not be tolerated in a free society
nonetheless might be constitutionally permissible if there is a compelling
government interest that out-weighs an individual’s rights.”6 Under this
utilitarian view, torture is morally permissible if the benefits to third
parties significantly outweigh the harm to the victim.
It just isn’t true that one should allow a nuclear war
rather than killing or torturing an innocent person. It
isn’t even true that one should allow the destruction of a
sizable city by a terrorist nuclear device rather than kill
or torture an innocent person.
To prevent such
extraordinary harms extreme actions seem to me to be
justified.7
No less a libertarian than Jeremy Bentham argued that there are
cases in which nobody would object to the deployment of torture.8
Bentham’s justification for the use of torture was based on case or act
utilitarianism—a demonstration that, in a particular case, the benefits
that would flow from the limited use of torture would outweigh its costs.
He emphasized:
Suppose an occasion, to arise, in which a suspicion is
entertained, as strong as that which would be received
as a sufficient ground for arrest and commitment as for
felony—a suspicion that at this very time a considerable
number of individuals are actually suffering, by illegal
violence inflictions equal in intensity to those which if
inflicted by the hand of justice, would universally be
spoken of under the name of torture. For the purpose of
rescuing from torture these hundred innocents, should
any scruple be made of applying equal or superior
torture, to extract the requisite information from the
mouth of one criminal, who having it in his power to
make known the place where at this time the enormity
was practising or about to be practised, should refuse to
Strauss, supra note 4, at 254.
Id. at 239.
7
Michael S. Moore, Torture and the Balance of Evils, 23 ISR. L. REV. 280, 328 (1989).
8
See W.L. Twining & P.E. Twining, Bentham on Torture, 24 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 305, 310
(1973).
5
6
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do so? To say nothing of wisdom, could any pretence be
made so much as to the praise of blind and vulgar
humanity, by the man who to save one criminal, should
determine to abandon a 100 innocent persons to the
same fate?9
In effect, this Article argues that there cannot be an absolutist
position taken with respect to any rights, not even fundamental rights.
Under this view, the universal norm against torture is not absolute, just
as the right of free speech and the right to be free from being
intentionally killed by another are not absolute. If the prohibition
against intentional homicide, for instance, were absolute, then selfdefense or killing to prevent someone from killing a third party, or to
prevent a suspected felon from escaping, would be impermissible. In
fact, the law regards these acts as not only permissible, but justifiable.
An absolutist position may come into conflict with our common
sense moral intuitions. A typical example would be a situation where
the killing of one innocent person would save the lives of many others, a
topic well addressed in the literature.10 While torture is a grievous and
9
See id. at 347 n.3 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Bentham Mss. Box 74.b., p. 429
(May 27, 1804)).
10
For instance, we might refer to a hypothetical dilemma posed by Bernard Williams, A
Critique of Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 75, 98 (Cambridge Univ.
Press 1973):
The captain of the local police in a small South American town is about to kill twenty
innocent Indians when Jim stumbles onto the scene. The captain gives Jim a choice. As a
courtesy to Jim, the captain says that if Jim kills one of the hostages, the captain will let the
other nineteen go free; if Jim refuses to accept the offer, all twenty will be executed.
Should Jim accept the offer? Is necessity a justification that makes it morally
permissible to proceed with the killing? Or, on deontological grounds, must Jim refuse?
Williams sees this as a difficult case but in the end seems inclined to say that Jim should kill
the one Indian. There is no realistic way of saving all twenty.
If Jim should refuse the “invitation” to kill the one innocent person, and instead walks
away from the situation, we would hesitate to condemn him even his refusal results in the
death of the entire group. Jim may regret the mass killing he failed to prevent, but yet he
will remain free of moral fault for having failed to act. By not acting, he simply allows
something to happen, which is the same result as if he had never come upon the scene in
the first place.
The argument in support of Jim’s shooting the one victim is that it is hard to see how
killing can be condemned as immoral when it leaves the victim no worse off—he would
have been shot anyway. Jim has no realistic way of saving all twenty of the Indians.
Killing the one Indian would not make that person any worse off than he was otherwise
going to be. The one suffers the same loss he would have suffered had Jim not been in the
picture. And on top of that the action benefits others substantially.
As the consequences become more catastrophic, if for instance, Jim’s action of killing
the one Indian would result in saving 1,000 others, deontological prohibitions would seem
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abominable practice that is universally condemned, if our moral
intuitions allow for exceptions in cases of intentional killing, it would
seem to provide exceptions in cases of nonlethal torture. But we need
not rely on intuitions. For our purposes, we may well rely on the
necessity doctrine and its application to cases of torture. Under this
doctrine, the letter of the law might be violated justifiably because of the
necessity of the circumstances, as explored in Part V.
III. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT TORTURE
A. International Law
Several international agreements prohibit the use of torture in any
circumstances, including the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,11 Article 5 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights,12 Article 7 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCRP”),13 and the United Nations
Convention Against Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (“the U.N. Convention”).14 These conventions
generally impose an absolute prohibition on the use of torture or other
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.
In 1994, the United States ratified the U.N. Convention,15 which
allows that “Certain rights may be restricted in emergency situations,”
and that such emergencies “must be proved to require a particular
restriction on a right” before derogation will be permitted.16 However, it
is clear that “No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state
to be increasingly problematic to guide one’s decision-making process. If one agrees that it
is morally permissible, or even morally required, that Jim commit the act, then, unless
torturing is worse than killing, one would allow the moral view that torture of a suspect is
permissible, if not morally required, when it will likely save the lives of many innocents.
11
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
12
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A.Res. 217A(III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at
71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948). “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” Id.
13
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171,
175 (1966) [hereinafter ICCPR]. “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment.” Id.
14
United Nations Convention Against Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N.
Doc. A/39/51 (Dec. 10, 1984) [hereinafter Convention Against Torture].
15
See Regulations Concerning the Convention Against Torture, 64 Fed. Reg. 8478, 8478
(Feb. 19, 1999).
16
John Quigley, International Limits on Use of Force to Elicit Confessions: A Critique of
Israel’s Policy on Interrogation, 14 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 485, 491-92 (1988).
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of war or a threat of war, internal political in stability or any other public
emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.”17 Thus, the
prohibition is absolute, admitting of no exceptions. The deontological
view that torture is prohibited under any circumstances has found its
way into customary international law, along with crimes against
humanity, genocide, rape, hijacking, and terrorism.18 Similarly, the
ICCPR expressly states in Article 2(2) that “No exceptional circumstances
whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political in
stability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification
of torture.”19 The absolutist approach means that if a terrorist in the
ticking bomb situation, which is discussed in Part IV, refuses to tell the
bomb’s location, then the consequences of the holocaust will simply have
to be endured. From a human rights approach, what matters is how we
live our lives; the act of torturing someone, for whatever reason, so
distorts human beings that it can never be allowed.
B. The De Facto Violation of Torture Conventions
In a study of whether countries that have signed human rights
treaties have refrained from using torture more than countries that have
not, Oona Hathaway found the difference to be almost statistically
insignificant, with an average gap of just 0.06 on a 1-to-5 scale.20 In fact,
according to Hathaway’s study, signators of the American Torture
Convention21 and the African Charter22 have worse records on torture
than the regional organizations that did not sign these treaties.23 States
that engage in torture to exact confessions or use it as a mode of
punishment always deny that they use torture.24

Convention Against Torture, supra note 14, at art. 2(2) (adopted by the U.N. General
Assembly, Dec. 12, 1984, and in effect since June 26, 1987, after it was ratified by twenty
nations).
18
See GEERT-JAN G. J. KNOOPS, DEFENSES IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW 29 (2001).
19
ICCPR, supra note 13, at art 2(2).
20
See Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J.
1935, 1978 (2002).
21
Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, Dec. 9, 1985, 25 I.L.M. 519
(entered into force Feb. 28, 1987).
22
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58 (entered
into force Oct. 21, 1986).
23
See Hathaway, supra note 20, at 1979.
24
See AMNESTY INT’L, REPORT ON TORTURE 104 (1975). “Though many authoritarian
regimes use torture, not one of even these openly admits it.” Is Torture Ever Justified?, THE
ECONOMIST, Jan. 11, 2003, at 9.
17
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It has been widely reported that the United States has transferred
terrorist suspects who refused to cooperate with their interrogators to
foreign intelligence services.25 Similarly, it is widely reported that
torture is used in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, the Philippines, Iran, and
Pakistan, among numerous other countries.26 A study of 195 countries
and territories by Amnesty International between 1997 and mid-2000
found reports of torture or ill-treatment by state officials in more than
150 countries,27 and in more than seventy countries, torture or illtreatment was reported as widespread or persistent.28
C. Definition of Torture
What exactly constitutes torture? Is there any agreement on the
definition of torture? Certainly, the boundaries of the concept of torture
are undefined. If we allow a largely sentimental definition of torture in
which it means whatever anyone wishes it to mean, or if virtually any
discomfort, physical, or emotional pain inflicted constitutes torture, the
concept loses its ability to shock and disgust. Moreover, universal
condemnation may be eroded if the definition is too broad.
Reasonable individuals might disagree as to whether keeping
individuals “standing or kneeling for hours, in black hoods or spraypainted goggles” constitutes torture, or whether holding them “in
awkward, painful positions and deprived of sleep with a 24-hour
bombardment of lights—subject to what are known as ‘stress and duress’
techniques[,]” constitute torture.29 In fact, certain techniques that involve
physical discomfort or pain, such as protracted standing against the wall
on tip toes, exposing a suspect to loud noise, putting hoods on suspects
during detention, while constituting inhumane and degrading treatment,
have also been held not to constitute torture.30 Other practices that may
constitute torture to some minds include solitary confinement for an
Dana Priest & Barton Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations: ‘Stress and
Duress’ Tactics Used on Terrorism Suspects Held in Secret Overseas Facilities, WASH. POST, Dec.
26, 2002, at A1. “Some who do not cooperate are turned over—’rendered,’ in official
parlance—to foreign intelligence services whose practice of torture has been documented
by the U.S. government and human rights organizations.” Id.
26
See Raviv, supra note 2, at 151-53.
27
AMNESTY INT’L, TORTURE WORLDWIDE: AN AFFRONT TO HUMAN DIGNITY 2 (2000).
28
See id.
29
Priest & Gellman, supra note 25, at A1.
30
See Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 25 (1978) (holding that protracted
standing against the wall on tip toes, covering the suspect’s head during detention,
exposing the suspect to loud noise for a prolonged period of time, and sleep, food, and
drink deprivation did not constitute torture, but were prohibited because they subjected
the suspect to inhuman and degrading treatment).
25
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extended period of time, dousing in ice cold water, playing of loud
music, or mental suffering inflicted on a person (such as threats of
execution or mock execution rituals).31 In some instances, torture might
not involve physical discomfort at all: for instance, reasonable people
might agree that to force a Muslim individual to fall to his knees and kiss
the cross can be humiliation and torture.
Yet others may think that the treatment of prisoners in the Abu
Ghraib prison, in which a number of Iraqi prisoners were subjected to
sexual humiliation, constituted torture.32 According to various accounts,
numerous prisoners at the detention center were hooded, stripped
naked, and mocked sexually by female guards. Other reports indicated
that detainees in Afghanistan’s Bagram Detention Center were subjected
to abuse in the form of sleep deprivation, punching and kicking, and
standing in difficult positions for prolonged periods of time.33 Two
prisoners died, and the death was listed by a military pathologist as
homicide.34 These acts, while certainly cruel, inhuman, and degrading,
might not amount to torture under the conventions discussed below. It
is debatable.
Torture is defined in the U.N. Convention as follows:
For the purposes of this Convention, the term “torture”
means any act by which severe pain or suffering,
whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on
a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a
third person information or a confession, punishing him
for an act he or a third person has committed or is
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or
coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based
on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or
suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with
the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other
person acting in an official capacity. It does not include

31
For a good discussion of what constitutes torture, see Emanuel Gross, Legal Aspects of
Tackling Terrorism: The Balance Between the Right of a Democracy To Defend Itself and the
Protection of Human Rights, 6 U.C.L.A. J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 89, 94-97 (2001).
32
See, e.g., Susan Sontag, Regarding the Torture of Others, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 23, 2004,
at 24.
33
See Douglas Jehl & David Rohde, The Struggle for Iraq: Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2004,
at A1, A12.
34
See id.
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pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or
incidental to lawful sanctions.35
In connection with ratification of the U.N. Convention by the United
States Senate, the following statement of understanding was set forth:
(2) Torture is an extreme form of cruel and inhuman
treatment and does not include lesser forms of cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment that do
not amount to torture. . . .
(4) In order to constitute torture, mental pain or
suffering must be prolonged mental harm caused by or
resulting from:
(i) The intentional infliction or threatened
infliction of severe physical pain or suffering;
(ii) The administration or application, or
threatened administration or application, of
mind altering substances or other procedures
calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or
the personality;
(iii) The threat of imminent death; or
(iv) The threat that another person will
imminently be subjected to death, severe
physical pain or suffering, or the administration
or application of mind altering substances or
other procedures calculated to disrupt
profoundly the sense or personality.36
Thus, in addition to physical torture there can be psychological
torture, such as threatening to execute the suspect, putting a gun to his
head and saying you will shoot, threatening to castrate him, telling him
that you are going to kill his family members if he does not tell you the
information you are seeking, and similar tactics that, while not
physically painful, inflict mental pain or suffering, even when there is no
intent to carry out such threats. The United States’s interpretation of the
U.N. Convention is that such infliction of mental pain or suffering must
be prolonged in order to constitute torture.
This “prolonged”
qualification is at odds with the definition provided by the U.N.
Convention itself.

Convention Against Torture, supra note 14, at art. 1(1).
See Regulations Concerning the Convention Against Torture, 64 Fed. Reg. 8478, 8490
(Feb. 19, 1999).

35
36
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In 1997, the United Nations Committee Against Torture concluded
that certain physical coercive methods employed by Israel during
interrogations of detainees, especially when used in combination,
constituted torture as defined by the U.N. Convention. The tactics
included forcing detainees to stand naked with their hands chained to
the ceiling and their feet shackled, covering their heads with black
hoods, forcing them to stand or kneel in uncomfortable positions in
extreme cold or heat, sleep deprivation, food deprivation, exposing them
to disorienting sounds and lights, and violent shaking.37
Thus, the nature and definition of torture, as discussed here,
involves more than coercive techniques, such as sleep deprivation or
bright lights. To be sure, breaking bones, burning skin, and ripping out
fingernails constitute “real, unambiguous torture” as opposed to threats
to cause pain, or deprivation of sleep or food.38 “[T]here is a world of
difference morally between the slight tortures of sleep deprivation and
the severe tortures of physical mutilation.”39
D. The United States Department of Justice Memoranda
An August 1, 2002 legal opinion prepared by the Department of
Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel40 received significant criticism and little
approbation for essentially authorizing and justifying torture.41 This
memorandum sought to interpret torture as defined under 18 U.S.C. §§
2340-2340A, which pertain to both physical torture and “severe mental
pain or suffering.” The memorandum stated that “[P]hysical pain
amounting to torture must be equivalent in intensity to the pain
accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment

37
See Dershowitz, The Torture Warrant, supra note 2, at 286 n.57 (citing Press Release, UN
Committee Against Torture, UN Committee Against Torture Concludes Eighteenth Session
Geneva (May 13, 1997)).
38
Stuart Taylor, Should We Hit Him?, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 10, 2003, at 52.
39
Moore, supra note 7, at 334.
40
Memorandum from U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, Office of the
Assistant Attorney General to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Standards of
Conduct for Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. 2340-2340A, at 46, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/dojinterrogationmemo200
20801.pdf [hereinafter Standards of Conduct Memorandum I].
41
See, e.g., Angell, supra note 2, at 557; Bilder & Vagts, supra note 2, at 689; Cornyn, supra
note 2, at 213; Marisa Lopez, Professional Reponsibility: Tortured Independence in the Office of
Legal Counsel, 57 FLA. L. REV. 685 (2005); Jesselyn Radack, Tortured Legal Ethics: The Role of
the Government Advisor in the War on Terrorism, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. l (2006); Rouillard, supra
note 2, at 9; Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House, l05
COLUM. L. REV. l68l (2005).
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of bodily function, or even death.”42 This interpretation was disavowed
in a later memorandum issued in 2004, discussed below.
Under the 2002 memorandum, for mental pain and suffering to
amount to torture, “it must result in significant psychological harm of
significant duration, e.g., lasting for months or even years.”43 The
memorandum sought to interpret the statutory text of 18 U.S.C. § 2340,
which states that “severe mental pain or suffering” means “prolonged
mental harm”44 that is caused by or results from the exact same
components stated in paragraph (4)(i)-(iv) of the Senate’s statement of
understanding that accompanied the ratification of the U.N. Convention,
quoted above.
The memorandum also argued that a defendant is guilty of torture
under the statute “only if he acts with the express purpose of inflicting
severe pain or suffering . . . .”45 Accordingly, if “a government defendant
were to harm an enemy combatant during an interrogation in a manner
that might arguably violate Section 2340A, he would be doing so in order
to prevent further attacks on the United States by the Al Qaeda terrorist
network.”46 And, if the defendant’s purpose is to obtain information,
even though he knows that “severe pain will result from his actions, . . .
he lacks the requisite specific intent” to violate the statute.47 The
memorandum also stated that interrogators could justify torture under
the doctrine of necessity and self-defense in connection with the “war on
terrorism.”48
The memorandum relied in part on the English High Court opinion
in Ireland v. United Kingdom,49 which held that inhuman or degrading
treatment is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition to constitute
torture. The techniques at issue in that case were (1) wall standing
(forcing detainees to remain for periods of some hours in a “stress
position”); (2) hooding (putting a dark bag over the detainees’ heads and
only removing it during interrogation); (3) subjection to continuous loud

42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
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Cohan: Torture and the Necessity Doctrine

2007]

Torture and the Necessity Doctrine

1599

and hissing noises; (4) sleep deprivation; and (5) deprivation of food and
drink.50
The 2002 memorandum by the U.S. Department of Justice was
superseded by another one published in 2004.51 The 2004 memorandum
diminishes the extreme statements in the earlier memorandum. It
reiterates that torture is a graver kind of act than mere ill treatment and
emphasizes that torture is an aggravated form of ill treatment. However,
it disagrees with the earlier view that an extremely high degree of
physical pain is necessary for torture to occur.52
IV. TORTURE AND THE TICKING BOMB SITUATION
A. The Nature of the Problem
As mentioned, under the deontological approach, torturing someone
in order to reveal the location of a ticking bomb that will detonate and
kill thousands of people is morally prohibited regardless of the beneficial
consequences. In his book, Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the
Threat, Responding to the Challenge, Alan Dershowitz argues that there is
little doubt that the use of nonlethal torture as well as other techniques of
coercion short of torture (such as very rough interrogation) can produce
leads that can help prevent the killing of many civilians.53

See id.
Memorandum from U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, Office of the
Assistant Attorney General, for James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney General, Legal
Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. 2340-2340A (Dec. 30, 2004), available at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/dojtorture123004mem.pdf [hereinafter
Standards of Conduct Memorandum II].
52
See id.
53
See ALAN DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS: UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT,
RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE 140 (Yale Univ. Press 2002) [hereinafter DERSHOWITZ, WHY
TERRORISM WORKS]. Apart from interrogational torture, another type of torture is done not
to extract information but to intimidate others or to deter dissent with the expected impact
of the news of the torture on other people over whom the torture victim has some power or
leadership. This is what we might call terroristic torture, the effect of which is to terrorize
people other than the victim of the torture. The victim’s suffering is being used as a means
to an end over which the victim has little control, namely to deter dissent. China and other
authoritarian states are known to use this technique.
Terroristic torture might be justified under the necessity doctrine in order to protect
national security by averting the evil of dissidents who may be urging the overthrow of
government or fomenting anarchy. One commentator proffered a list of necessary
conditions, all of which would have to be satisfied in order for terroristic torture to be
morally permissible:
A first necessary condition would be that the purpose actually being
sought through the torture would need to be not only morally good
50
51
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The ticking bomb is a situation when a terrorist who admits to
planting a weapon of mass destruction in a largely populated city but
refuses to say where—a situation that has been discussed by
philosophers, including Michael Walzer, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Jeremy
Bentham.54 Of course, we can imagine other situations that do not
involve bombs but are equally perilous, such as a planned release of a
deadly chemical or biological agency. Waltzer described such a
hypothetical case in which a decent leader of a nation plagued with
terrorism is asked

but supremely important, and examples of such purposes would have
to be selected by criteria of moral importance which would themselves
need to be justified. Second, terroristic torture would presumably
have to be the least harmful means of accomplishing the supremely
important goal. Given how very harmful terroristic torture is, this
could rarely be the case. And it would be unlikely unless the period of
use of the torture in the society was limited in an enforceable manner.
Third, it would have to be absolutely clear for what purpose the
terroristic torture was being used, what would constitute achievement
of that purpose, and thus, when the torture would end. The torture
could not become a standard practice of government for an indefinite
duration.
Henry Shue, Torture, 7 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 124, 137-38 (1978). Shue notes with skepticism that
is it hard to conceive any “supremely important end” to which terroristic torture would be
the least harmful means of attaining. Id. Such use of torture could have the effect of
creating outrage in the population and exacerbated unrest over a tyrannical regime. On the
other hand if terroristic torture is effective in quieting dissent from the perspective of the
government, since it “worked,” it would continue to be used.
54
Another scenario is this: Suppose a terrorist has planted a megaton atomic bomb that
will obliterate several square miles and kill hundreds of thousands of people. Either
torture the terrorist who will provide the specific location about the bomb in time to find it
and neutralize it; or drop several large bombs on the vicinity where the bomb is known to
be located, killing hundreds of innocent adult and children civilians in the vicinity, but
preventing the bomb from detonating and killing thousands of others.
This “solution” is not farfetched. On the morning of September 11, 2001, after the
World Trade Center was hit, and it appeared clear that a terrorist hijacking was in progress
with United Flight 93, some eighty miles inbound from Washington, D.C., the Vice
President, based on his prior conversation with the President, authorized Air Force fighter
aircraft to shoot down the hijacked aircraft. See Excerpts from Report on Orders To Shoot
Down Planes on Sept. 11, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2004, at A17. Officials believed that the plane
was headed towards the U.S. Capitol or the White House. Id. Innocent people who
themselves were non-threats were so situated that they were subject to an order to be killed
in order to avert a greater danger. Id.
Subsequently, the German Parliament passed a law authorizing the military to shoot
down civilian airplanes if it believes they are being used in a 9/11-style terrorist attack. See
Kristen Grieshaber, World Briefing Germany: New Air Security Law, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2004,
at A4. In addition, Poland enacted a similar law that allows the head of the Polish Air
Force to order hijacked aircraft shot down as a last resort. See Victor Homola, World
Briefing Poland: Law Allows Hijacked Planes to be Shot Down, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2005, at A9.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss4/6

Cohan: Torture and the Necessity Doctrine

2007]

Torture and the Necessity Doctrine

1601

to authorize the torture of a captured rebel leader who
knows or probably knows the location of a number of
bombs hidden in apartment buildings around the city,
set to go off within the next twenty-four hours. He
orders the man tortured, convinced that he must do so
for the sake of the people who might otherwise die in
the explosions—even though he believes that torture is
wrong, indeed abominable, not just sometimes, but
always.55
Dershowitz acknowledges that the use of torture is a violation of
core civil liberties and human rights, but he argues that a cost-benefit
analysis illustrates the justification for employing nonlethal torture.56
Moreover, Dershowitz clearly understands certain deontological
objections. He says:
The case against torture, if made by a Quaker who
opposes the death penalty, war, self-defense, and the use
of lethal force against fleeing felons, is understandable.
But for anyone who justifies killing on the basis of a costbenefit analysis, the case against the use of nonlethal
torture to save multiple lives is more difficult to make.57
On a related point, Dershowitz emphasizes that the law permits judges
to imprison witnesses who refuse to testify after being given a grant of
immunity.58 A recalcitrant witness may be imprisoned until he talks,
and prison is designed to be punitive—that is, painful.
“Such
imprisonment can, on occasion, produce more pain and greater risk of
death than nonlethal torture. Yet we continue to threaten and use the
pain of imprisonment to loosen the tongues of reluctant witnesses.”59
Michael Walzer, Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands, 2 PHIL & PUB. AFF. 160, 167
(1973).
56
DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS, supra note 53, at 144.
The simple cost-benefit analysis for employing such nonlethal torture
seems overwhelming: it is surely better to inflict nonlethal pain on one
guilty terrorist who is illegally withholding information needed to
prevent an act of terrorism than to permit a large number of innocent
victims to die. Pain is a lesser and more remediable harm than death;
and the lives of a thousand innocent people should be valued more
than the bodily integrity of one guilty person.
Id.
57
Id. at 148.
58
For example, it is illegal to withhold relevant information from a grand jury after
receiving immunity. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
59
DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS, supra note 53, at 147.
55
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Therefore, the imposition of nonlethal torture, in circumstances where a
great many lives are in jeopardy, would seem unobjectionable.
Further, Dershowitz points to the anomaly in the law that permits
police to use lethal force against fleeing suspects of dangerous felonies,
even though they are only suspects not yet brought to trial. “The very
idea of deliberately subjecting a captive human being to excruciating
pain violates our sense of what is acceptable.”60 It seems far worse to
shoot and kill a fleeing felon in the back than to torture an informant in
the ticking bomb situation; yet every civilized government authorizes
shooting a suspected felon who flees from the police. With nonlethal
torture, the pain is temporary, while death is permanent. “In our
modern age death is underrated, while pain is overrated.”61
B. Torture Warrants
Dershowitz suggests that “torture warrants” might be
implemented—a procedure which would require an application on the
part of investigators and, if due cause is shown, a magistrate to authorize
the procedure. Torture warrants were in frequent use in England during
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In his book on legalized torture,
Torture and the Law of Proof, John Langbein points out that torture was
used to obtain evidence necessary to prove the guilt of the accused under
the rigorous standards of evidence of the time, which required either the
testimony of two eyewitnesses or the confession of the accused;
circumstantial evidence was simply inadmissible in those days. Thus, if
officials had a “suspicion” based on compelling circumstantial evidence
of guilt, they would want to pursue their hunches and seek to exact a
“direct” confession from the suspect by obtaining a torture warrant.62
Torture was also used for people who were convicted of capital
crimes, such as high treason, in an effort to obtain further information
necessary to prevent future attacks on the state. Langbein shows that of
eighty-one torture warrants, issued between 1540 and 1640, many of
them were used for discovery in order to protect the government from
plots.63 Of course, torture was undoubtedly abused, as is famously
known during the reign of Henry VIII.

60
61
62
63

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss4/6

Id. at 155.
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This Article mentions Dershowitz’s proposal of torture warrants
only in passing. Of course, one might well argue against this procedure
in that officials might abuse their discretion in applying for torture
warrants; both the granting or the denial of torture warrants would have
severe repercussions, and in emergencies there may simply be
insufficient time to apply for a torture warrant.
C. Is the Fifth Amendment a Bar to Torture?
The Fifth Amendment prohibits compelled self-incrimination, which
means that statements elicited by means of torture or other coercive
techniques may not be introduced into evidence against the individual
being tortured.64 Coerced confessions are inadmissible in court, whether
the confession is obtained by physical brutality or induced by such
tactics as lengthy incommunicado detentions,65 sleep deprivation,66
involuntary nakedness,67 “truth serum,”68 or protracted questioning over
a period of days.69
However, the use of torture solely to gain information is a separate
matter. In Leon v. Wainwright,70 apparently for the first time in American
jurisprudence, the Florida Court of Appeals “articulated a distinction
between violent police conduct, the purpose of which is to gain
information which might save a life, and such conduct employed for the
purpose of obtaining evidence to be used in a court of law.”71 In Leon,
the defendant was convicted of kidnapping and possession of a firearm
during commission of a felony.72 On a writ of habeas corpus, the Court
of Appeals considered the question of whether Leon’s post-arrest
confession should have been suppressed as the product of earlier police
threats and physical violence.73 Violence had certainly occurred in these
circumstances. The defendant kidnapped a cabdriver and held him for
64
See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (holding that confessions obtained
by torture as a basis for conviction and sentence was a clear denial of due process). But see
Leon v. Wainwright, 734 F.2d 770 (llth Cir. l984) (holding that a subsequent statement made
by a suspect who had been previously tortured into revealing the location of a kidnap victim
could be introduced into evidence).
65
See Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961);
Ashcroft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
66
See Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 519 (1968).
67
See Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945).
68
Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 307-08 (1963) (citations omitted).
69
See Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
70
Leon v. Wainwright, 734 F.2d 770, 772-73 (11th Cir. 1984).
71
Leon v. Florida, 410 So. 2d 201, 206 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
72
Leon, 734 F.2d at 771.
73
Id. at 772.
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ransom; the cabdriver’s brother then contacted the police and arranged
to meet the defendant to give him $4,000 in ransom money.74 At the
arranged meeting in a parking lot, the defendant pulled a gun on the
brother, and the police who had accompanied him immediately arrested
the defendant.75 The police demanded that he tell them where the
kidnapped victim was being held, and when he refused, “‘he was set
upon by several of the officers. They threatened and physically abused
him by twisting his arm behind his back and choking him until he
revealed where [the victim] was being held.’”76
After he provided the information, the police safely recovered the
victim.77 The defendant was later questioned at the police station by a
separate group of police officers, and after waiving his right to have
counsel present, confessed to the kidnapping.78 That incriminating
statement was later used at trial, though the admissions made to police
in the parking lot were not used at trial.79 The Eleventh Circuit said that
the second confession was voluntary, but that the first statement was
coerced.80 Specifically, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits prosecutorial use of coerced confessions, but
because the parking lot confession was not used against the defendant,
there was no violation of his rights.81 The Eleventh Circuit unanimously
held that, while it does not condone the use of force and coercion by
police officers,
this case does not represent the typical case of
unjustified force. We did not have an act of brutal law
enforcement agents trying to obtain a confession in total
disregard of the law. This was instead a group of
concerned officers acting in a reasonable manner to
obtain information they needed in order to protect
another individual from bodily harm or death.82
Additionally, the “violence was not inflicted to obtain a confession
or provide other evidence to establish appellant’s guilt. Instead it was
motivated by the immediate necessity to find the victim and save his
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
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life.”83 Leon is interesting in that it, in effect, condoned the use of torture
by police under the necessity doctrine—that is, under circumstances
where it reasonably appears necessary to avert a greater and imminent
harm. The ruling effectively allowed the police to engage in torture in
order to find the kidnapping victim and save him from bodily harm or
death.
Similarly, it has been suggested that if a suspect is given immunity
from prosecution and then tortured into providing information about a
future terrorist act, his privilege against self-incrimination is not
violated.84 In this regard, Dershowitz has argued that the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
does not prohibit any interrogation techniques including
the use of truth serum or even torture. The privilege
only prohibits the introduction into evidence of the fruits of
such techniques in a criminal trial against the person on
whom the techniques were used. Thus, if a confession
were elicited from a suspect by the use of truth serum or
torture, that confession—and its fruits—could not be
used against that suspect. But it could be used against
another suspect, or against that suspect in a non-criminal
case, such as a deportation hearing.
If a suspect is given “use immunity”—a judicial decree
announcing in advance that nothing the defendant says
(or its fruits) can be used against him in a criminal
case—he can be compelled to answer all proper questions.
The question then becomes what sorts of pressures can
constitutionally be used to implement that compulsion.
We know that he can be imprisoned until he talks. But
what if imprisonment is insufficient to compel him to do
what he has a legal obligation to do? Can other
techniques of compulsion be attempted?
Let’s start with truth serum. What right would be
violated if an immunized suspect who refused to
83
Id. at 773 n.5. In its consideration of this case, the Florida court noted that “we do not
attempt to resolve the moral and philosophical problem of whether the force used on Leon
in the emergency, life-threatening situation presented to the arresting officers was
‘justified’ or ‘proper.’” Leon, 410 So. 2d at 203 n.3. Thus, the court viewed the question as a
moral and philosophical one, rather than a legal issue.
84
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 44l (l972).
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comply with his legal obligation to answer questions
truthfully were compelled to submit to an injection
which made him do so? Not his privilege against selfincrimination, since he has no such privilege now that he
has been given immunity. What about his right of
bodily integrity? The involuntariness of the injection
itself does not pose a constitutional barrier. No less a
civil libertarian than Justice William J. Brennan rendered
a decision that permitted an allegedly drunken driver to
be involuntarily injected in order to remove blood for
alcohol testing. Certainly there can be no constitutional
distinction between an injection that removes a liquid and
one that injects a liquid. What about the nature of the
substance injected? If it is relatively benign and creates
no significant health risk, the only issue would be that it
compels the recipient to do something he doesn’t want
to do. But he has a legal obligation to do precisely what
the serum compels him to do: answer all questions
truthfully.85
On the other hand, several courts have ruled that a Due Process
violation occurs at the moment coercive questioning overcomes the will
of the suspect, regardless of whether the evidence is used at trial, based
on a “shock the conscience” approach. For example, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the coercion of a police statement from a
suspect is not a “full-blown Constitutional violation” of the Due Process
Clause only when the statement is used against the suspect in court—the
violation “is complete with the coercive behavior itself.”86 In addition,
the Supreme Court, in Chavez v. Martinez,87 held that a victim of police
brutality could bring a cause of action for civil rights violations under the
Due Process Clause, even though there was no criminal trial. The
Court’s decision seems to be based broadly on placing appropriate limits
on police behavior and with respecting an individual’s dignity and
autonomy. Specifically, Justice Kennedy wrote that “it seems to me a
85
86

DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS, supra note 53, at 247-48.
Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220, 1244-45 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
Can the coercing by police of a statement from a suspect in custody
ripen into a full-blown Constitutional violation only if and when the
statement is tendered and used against the declarant in court? We
think not. . . . The due process violation caused by coercive behavior of
law-enforcement officers in pursuit of a confession is complete with
the coercive behavior itself.

Id.
87
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simple enough matter to say that use of torture or its equivalent in an
attempt to induce a statement violates an individual’s fundamental right
to liberty of the person. The Constitution does not countenance the
official imposition of severe pain or pressure for purposes of
interrogation.”88 However, in a ticking bomb situation, as distinguished
from “ordinary” police brutality, it has been argued that “no
constitutional violation would be found if the circumstances
surrounding the use of torture were sufficiently compelling.”89
Another basic question arises: Is the Eighth Amendment a bar to
torture? The simple answer is that the Eighth Amendment’s right to be
free from “cruel and unusual punishment” applies solely to punishment
after conviction.90 In the ticking bomb situation, torture would be
employed against an individual to extract information, not as
punishment following conviction of an offense.
V. THE NECESSITY DOCTRINE AND THE TICKING BOMB SITUATION
A. An Overview of the Necessity Doctrine
The doctrine of necessity, with its inevitable weighing of choices-ofevil, may be stretched to the outer limits in the context of torture. The
doctrine holds that certain conduct, though it violates the law and
produces a harm, is justified because it averts a greater evil and hence
produces a net social gain or benefit to society.91 Glanville Williams
expressed the necessity doctrine this way: “some acts that would
otherwise be wrong are rendered rightful by a good purpose, or by the
necessity of choosing the lesser of two evils.”92 He offers this example:
Suppose that a dike threatens to give way, and the actor
is faced with the choice of either making a breach in the
dike, which he knows will result in one or two people
being drowned, or doing nothing, in which case he
knows that the dike will burst at another point involving
a whole town in sudden destruction. In such a situation,
Id. at 796 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
Strauss, supra note 4, at 268.
90
“An examination of the history of the [Eighth] Amendment and the decisions of this
Court construing the proscription against cruel and unusual punishment confirms that it
was designed to protect those convicted of crimes. We adhere to this longstanding
limitation . . . .” Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977).
91
See Joseph J. Simeone, “Survivors” of the Eternal Sea: A Short True Story, 45 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 1123, 1141 (2001).
92
GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 198 (1957).
88
89
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where there is an unhappy choice between the
destruction of one life and the destruction of many,
utilitarian philosophy would certainly justify the actor in
preferring the lesser evil.93
The utilitarian idea is that certain illegal conduct ought not be punished
because, due to the special circumstances of the situation, a net benefit to
society has resulted. This utilitarian rationale is sometimes criticized as
“ends-justifying-the-means” because the doctrine allows that, within
certain limits, it is justifiable to break the letter of the law if doing so will
produce a net benefit to society.94 Yet another commentator has
observed:
[T]hese [justified] acts are ones, as regard which, upon
balancing all considerations of public policy, it seems
desirable that they should be encouraged and
commended even though in each case some individual
may be injured or the result may be otherwise not
wholly to be desired.95
As a result, the necessity doctrine “represents a concession to human
weakness in cases of extreme pressure, where the accused breaks the law
rather than submitting to the probability of greater harm if he does not
break the law.”96 The idea, in its simplest form, is that it is unjust to
penalize someone for violating the law when the action produces a
greater good or averts a greater evil. Had the unlawful action not taken
place, society would have endured a greater evil than that which
resulted from violating the law. English and American courts have long
recognized the defense of necessity as a common law principle, even in

WILLIAMS, supra note 92, at 199-200.
Justice Brandeis in a famous dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485
(1928), noted:
In a government of laws, existence of the government would be
imperilled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. . . . Crime is
contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds
contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it
invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal
law the end justifies the means—to declare that the Government may
commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal—
would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this
Court should resolutely set its face.
95
JUSTIN MILLER, HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 189 (West Pub. Co. 1934).
96
A. J. Ashworth, Reason, Logic and Criminal Liability, 91 L. Q. REV. 102, 106 (1975).
93
94

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss4/6

Cohan: Torture and the Necessity Doctrine

2007]

Torture and the Necessity Doctrine

1609

the absence of statutory law on the subject.97 Today, many states have
enacted varying forms of a statutory necessity defense.98 Accordingly,
with the necessity defense, there will always be a prima facie violation of
the law. It might involve the violation of a minor traffic law, with no
harm caused to life or limb, but the technical violation of the law will
nonetheless count as a harm to society. In other instances, the violation
of law may involve tortious conduct that causes damages to economic or
property interests. Or, the violation of law may involve serious criminal
conduct that results in the maiming of innocent people. The one
exception appears to be cases involving intentional homicide. The
necessity defense may not be used to justify intentional killing, even if
the act produces a net saving of lives. In other words, the doctrine of
necessity is itself subject to deontological constraints (i.e., with respect to
intentional homicide).99
The doctrine of necessity has been expressed in numerous ways, but
this discussion applies a comprehensive six-prong test that must be met
in order for someone to invoke the defense. The defendant must prove
(1) that he was faced with a choice of evils and chose the lesser evil; (2)
that he acted to prevent imminent harm; (3) that he reasonably
anticipated a causal relationship between his conduct and the harm to be
avoided; and (4) that there were no other legal alternatives to violating

97
Edward B. Arnolds & Norman F. Garland, The Defense of Necessity in Criminal Law: The
Right To Choose the Lesser Evil, 65 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 289, 291-96 (1974).
98
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.320 (2002); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-604 (2004); COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-702 (West 2003); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,§ 463 (2001); HAW. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 703-302 (LexisNexis 2003); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 503.030 (West 2003); MO.
ANN. STAT. § 563.026 (West 2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:3-2 (West 2004); N.Y. PENAL LAW §
35.05 (McKinney 2004); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.22 (Vernon 2004); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
939.47 (West 2003).
99
See, e.g., Regina v. Dudley & Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273, 286-87 (1884). The Court held
that nothing can justify intentionally killing an “innocent,” “unoffending” individual,
unless the killing can be justified by some well-recognised excuse
admitted by the law. It is further admitted that there was in this case
no such excuse, unless the killing was justified by what has been called
“necessity.” But the temptation to the act which existed here was not
what the law has ever called necessity. Nor is this to be regretted.
See also, R.I. Recreation Ctr., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 177 F.2d 603, 605 (1st Cir. 1949)
(stating that “It appears to be established . . . that . . . necessity will never excuse taking the
life of an innocent person . . . .”). But see United States v. Holmes, 26 Fed. Cas. 360
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842) (Case No. 15,383). This is the only case in Anglo-American law that
explicitly suggests, in dictum, that the necessity defense might be appropriately invoked in
the killing of innocents where an imminent danger threatens the entire group with death,
provided a fair method of sacrifice is employed. Id. However, the court held that, in this
case the necessity defense did not apply to the facts. Id.
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the law.100 Additionally, the fifth factor is that “the Legislature has not
acted to preclude the defense by a clear and deliberate choice regarding
the values at issue.”101 Finally, a sixth factor is that the necessitous
circumstances were not caused by the negligent or reckless acts of the
defendant in the first instance.102 Courts generally require that all
factors be proven in order for the defendant to succeed in the necessity
defense.103
Courts generally require that all of the factors be proven in order for
the defendant to succeed in invoking the necessity defense. A further
consideration is what standard will apply in assessing the existence of a
given factor. In evaluating the individual elements of the necessity
doctrine, if a jury is impaneled, much depends on jury instructions.104
For instance, if the judge instructs the jury to construe the second
factor—the imminence factor—to require evidence that the threatened
harm was imminent in fact, the defendant might be found culpable if the
situation was a “false alarm.” On the other hand, if the instruction is to

United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 693 (9th Cir. 1989).
Commonwealth v. Brugmann, 433 N.E.2d 457, 461 (Mass. 1982); see also Missouri v.
Diener, 706 S.W.2d 582, 585 (1986) (quoting same language).
102
See, e.g., United States v. Agard, 605 F.2d 665, 667 (2d Cir. 1979). “[D]efendant must
show . . . that defendant had not recklessly or negligently placed himself in a situation in
which it was probable that he would be forced to choose the criminal conduct].” Id.
103
In this discussion of torture to these six factors are referred to as follows: (1) the
choice-of-evils factor; (2) the imminence factor; (3) the causal nexus factor; (4) the legal way
out factor; (5) the preemption factor; and (6) the clean hands factor.
104
One author has opined that the question of justification in torture situations is simply
too complex for juries to decide:
Allowing juries to make decisions about justification would have the
disadvantage of inconsistency. Two different juries, judging the same
torture case, might well come to differing conclusions about whether
torture was warranted in that particular circumstance. They might
come to this conclusion not because they come to different conclusions
with respect to the facts, but rather because they have different views
about whether a certain act was truly justified. Some jurors might
think that torture is never justified, or is justified only when it is
necessary to stop a nuclear scale attack. Other jurors might be willing
to see a suspect tortured even to save one life, or perhaps even an
unoccupied building if the suspect is unsympathetic enough. Jurors
might also have highly variant views about which methods of torture
are worse than others, and therefore are less permissible except in the
most extreme circumstances. Some jurors might be swayed by horror
at the fact that a government agent used his authority to inflict extreme
pain on a captive, while others might be more concerned with the
innocent life that agent was trying to save.
Raviv, supra note 2, at 176.
100
101
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decide whether the threat reasonably appeared to be imminent, the
defendant would be in a better position to assert the necessity defense.
Courts almost always scrutinize the facts based on the balance of
human reason in light of all the relevant circumstances. The actor must
entertain a reasonable belief in the necessity of his conduct. The
reasonableness standard ensures that a jury, in evaluating the
defendant’s action, shares the actor’s evaluation of the necessitous
circumstances. This standard has been expressed as follows:
While an accused’s perceptions of the surrounding facts
may be highly relevant in determining whether his
conduct should be excused, those perceptions remain
relevant only so long as they are reasonable. The
accused person must, at the time of the act, honestly
believe, on reasonable grounds, that he faces a situation
of imminent peril that leaves no reasonable legal
alternative open. There must be a reasonable basis for
the accused’s beliefs and actions. but it would be proper
to take into account circumstances that legitimately
affect the accused person’s ability to evaluate the
situation. The test cannot be a subjective one, and the
accused who argues that he perceived imminent peril
without an alternative would only succeed with the
defence of necessity if his belief was reasonable given his
circumstances and attributes.105
Under this standard, it is not sufficient if an interrogator subjectively
believes that an act of torture is necessary to prevent a greater evil.106
Under the reasonableness standard, an actor must reasonably construe
that there is an actual, imminent threat in the first place and, in making a
choice–of-evils, that one evil was greater than the other. The threat need
not be an actual threat, provided that the actor has a well-founded belief
that impending harm will result unless he takes steps to avert it.107 The
Regina v. Latimer, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 3, at ¶ 33 (Can.) (emphasis added).
See Tom Stacy, Acts, Omissions, and the Necessity of Killing Innocents, 29 AM. J. CRIM. L.
481, 518 (2002).
107
See, e.g., United States v. Ashton, 24 F. Cas. 873 (C.C.D. Mass. 1834) (No. 14, 470)
(Story, J.) (involving a group of sailors charged with mutiny). The defendants sought to
justify mutiny on the grounds that their ship was not seaworthy. Id. The court instructed
the jury “that the defendants ought not to be found guilty, if they acted bona fide upon
reasonable grounds of belief that the ship was unseaworthy . . . .” Id. at 874. The court said
that if in fact the crew was mistaken as to the un-seaworthiness of the ship, the jury could
determine whether, nonetheless, the crew was reasonable in holding its belief and in taking
105
106
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balancing of evils “cannot, of course, be committed to the private
judgment of the actor, but must, in most cases, be determined at trial
with due regard being given for the crime charged and the higher value
sought to be achieved.”108 A person’s conduct will not be excused by
necessity merely because he thought it served a “higher value.”109
1.

The Choice-of-Evils Factor

The threshold factor is whether employing torture is, in fact, the
lesser evil in a ticking bomb situation. A deontologist might argue that it
is by no means clear that torture would be a “lesser evil,” even in a
ticking bomb case, in light of the severe effects of these measures on the
interrogee. Putting that towards one side, one might consider these
issues: the number of lives at risk, the availability of other means to
acquire the information, the degree of force to be used, and the
likelihood that the suspect has the relevant information. Obviously, the
greater the number of lives at risk, the more the choice-of-evils weighs in
favor of torturing the suspect.110

action in accordance with that reasonable belief. Id. The jury could acquit if it found that
the crew, “having acted upon their best judgment fairly, and in a case where respectable,
intelligent, and impartial witnesses should assert, that they should have done the
same . . . .” Id.
108
Vermont v. Warshow, 410 A.2d 1000, 1003 (Vt. 1979).
109
Glanville Williams, Necessity, 1978 CRIM. L. REV. 128, 134.
110
Mirko Bagaric and Julie Clarke have devised a kind of algorithm in evaluating
whether a particular situation warrants the use of torture:
[T]he strength of the case in favor of torture can be mapped as follows:
W+L+P
TxO
Where:
W = whether the agent is the wrongdoer
L = the number of lives that will be lost if the information is not
provided
P = the probability that the agent has the relevant knowledge
T = the time available before the disaster will occur (“immediacy of the
harm”)
O = the likelihood that other inquiries will forestall the risk
Torture should be permitted where the application of the variables
exceeds a threshold level. Once beyond this level, the higher the figure
the more severe the forms of torture that are permissible.
Bagaric & Clarke, supra note 2, at 614.
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The degree of force to be used and the degree of the suspect’s
culpability are interrelated. For instance, one needs to analyze the
degree of force in light of the degree of the suspect’s ability to provide
the relevant information in order to properly assess the choice-of-evils.
How certain is it that this suspect knows where the bomb is? How
agonizing would the torture be? Would less extreme methods likely
work on this individual?
Some individuals are highly immune to physical interrogation, yet
they may possess the information being sought to avert an imminent
terrorist attack. In such an instance, is it justified to use extreme torture
rather than more moderate types of physical abuse? Would it be
acceptable to torture the suspect’s child in his presence, hoping to get the
suspect to disclose where a detonating device has been planted? How
many lives would need to be in jeopardy before you might say “Yes”? If
one million lives would be saved? One might keep in mind that the
utilitarian underpinning of the necessity doctrine permits just about any
preventive action, no matter how severe, short of intentional homicide,
as long as the other elements are satisfied.
Another issue in assessing the choice-of-evils is the impact that the
use of torture might have on the psyche of society as a whole. A
deontologist would argue that there would be a significant harm to
society if it were to endorse and engage in torture, and hence there
would be a net loss of social goods. “Specifically, the inability of the
United States to maintain the moral high ground both in its fight against
terrorism and in its fight against torture and human rights abuses
around the world must be part of the calculus . . . .”111
Another concern in the choice-of-evils analysis is that officials could
become desensitized to the moral objectionability of torture once it is
employed and that torture erodes the humanity of those who are the
torturers. However, the threat of terrorist attacks is a rare occurrence,
and it may be exceedingly rare that a ticking bomb case would become a
reality. Thus, a typical official very likely would never actually face the
choice of whether to torture a suspect.
Also weighing in the balance is that if we use torture, then we
should not be surprised if our enemies mistreat our citizens who might
be taken as hostages or prisoners in reliance on the precedent we have
set, or use that precedent to justify their own conduct. Indeed, we have
111

Strauss, supra note 4, at 268-69.
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seen just such a tit-for-tat sort of case in June, 2004, when, in the wake of
the Abu Ghraib prison abuse scandal, Islamist militants abducted Paul
M. Johnson, an American working in Saudi Arabia, in order to inflict the
same abuse that had been inflicted on Iraqi detainees. His captors
subsequently beheaded Johnson in a gruesome video distributed
worldwide.112 Dershowitz acknowledges that, “Inevitably, the
legitimation of torture by the world’s leading democracy would provide
a welcome justification for its more widespread use in other parts of the
world.”113 In addition, the Israeli-Palestinian experience has shown that,
in the long-term, torture is an ineffective method to prevent terrorism, as
it increases hostility and the justifications for torture also justify
terrorism. 114 Thus, it is important to consider the reality that “torture
creates resentments, fears, and hatreds that, in the long run, are far more
destructive than any evil it might avoid.”115
Another consideration under the choice-of-evils factor involves the
slippery slope problem: even if the act of torture will likely save many
lives, it ought not be employed because of the slippery slope effect that
leads to abuse in less dire cases. There is the danger that, once
introduced, the government will resort to torture in ever increasing
circumstances; there is no convenient stopping point. While no one
would seriously endorse the wholesale use of torture, once torture is
legitimized in some cases, many unjustified acts of torture are likely to
occur.116
Torture might actually become formally institutionalized and
become the norm rather than the exception. According to Amnesty
112
See Craig Whitlock, Islamic Militants Behead American in Saudi Arabia, WASH. POST, June
20, 2004, at A6.
113
DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS, supra note 53, at 145.
114
See Barak Cohen, Democracy and the Mis-rule of Law: The Israeli Legal System’s Failure To
Prevent Torture in the Occupied Territories, 12 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 75, 90 (2001)
(quoting in part Sanford H. Kadish, Torture, the State and the Individual, 23 ISR. L. REV. 345,
353 (1989)).
On a long-term view, torture fails to prevent terrorism because it
builds hostility in the Palestinians of the Territories, encouraging them
to support and pursue terrorism. Also, the very rationale used to
justify torture, mutatis mutandis, justifies terrorism. As Sanford H.
Kadish noted, “[i]f the norm to prevail for torture and other cruel
treatment is that it may be justified if the evils to be avoided are great
and significant enough, how can a similar qualification be denied to
the resort to acts of terrorism?”
Id.
115
Louis Michael Seidman, Torture’s Truth, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 881, 893 (2005).
116
See Cohen, supra note 114, at 91.
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International, torture tends to become entrenched in a bureaucracy and
becomes
“administrative
practice”—a
routine
procedure
institutionalized into the method of governing.117 If torture is allowed
for one purpose, then why not extend its use to other high-stake
purposes, or even in ordinary criminal cases, where a suspect in custody
clearly has critical information, but refuses to provide it through
ordinary interrogation? For instance, why not use torture on someone
who likely knows the name or whereabouts of a serial killer? It may
come to be used for minor purposes or used when not actually necessary
and the bureaucracy’s existence may depend upon frequent use of the
practice. In other words, “the legitimization of repugnant practices in
special cases inevitably loosens antipathy to them in all cases,” and
“[w]hen torture is no longer unthinkable, it will be thought about.”118
Richard Posner has noted:
If rules are promulgated permitting torture in defined
circumstances, some officials are bound to want to
explore the outer bounds of the rules. Having been
regularized, the practice will become regular. Better to
leave in place the formal and customary prohibitions,
but with the understanding that they will not be
enforced in extreme circumstances.119
To counter these concerns, Dershowitz suggests that the slippery slope
concern can be abated by insuring that torture would be “limited by
acceptable principles of morality”—that is, its use would be constrained
by some sort of “principled break.”120
But another slippery slope concern is that the sheer brutality of
torture techniques might escalate. If nonlethal torture of one person is
justified in an extreme case, then what if it became necessary to use lethal
torture, or torture that poses a substantial risk of death? What is to limit
the candidate of torture to the suspect himself—why not torture the
suspect’s mother or threaten to kill his family, friends, or compatriots?
This prospect is not merely hypothetical; a former CIA officer suggested
that the CIA should consider targeting close relatives of known terrorists
as a means to coerce intelligence from the terrorists. “You get their
See AMNESTY INT’L, REPORT ON ALLEGATIONS OF TORTURE IN BRAZIL (Amnesty Int’l
Publ’n. 3d. ed. 1976).
118
Kadish, supra note 114, at 353.
119
Richard Posner, The Best Offense, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 2, 2002, at 28 (book review).
120
DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS, supra note 53, at 147.
117
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mothers and their brothers and their sisters under your complete control,
and then you make that known to the target . . . . You imply or you
directly threaten [that] his family is going to pay the price if he makes
the wrong decision.”121
2.

The Imminence of Harm Factor

Imminence signifies some sort of immediacy of the threat, but how
immediate must be the threat to be “imminent” in order to justify
torture? What if the ticking bomb is to go off not within a day or so, but
within the month? Or a week? The imminence requirement generally
means that the threatened harm is something that is temporally quite
proximate to the present moment. Bentham alludes to the imminence
factor in saying that torture “ought not to be employed but in cases
which admit of no delay; in cases in which if the thing done were not
done immediately there is a certainty, at least a great probability, that the
doing it would not answer the purpose.”122
If the threat is not imminent, then there is time to employ traditional
methods of law enforcement and other reasonable legal means to
uncover the pertinent facts. However, the question of imminence must
be construed in light of the gravity of the harm to be averted. If the
gravity of the threat is enormous, such as a ticking nuclear bomb that
may kill many thousands of people, the threat may be days away, but
the gravity of the threat may justify extreme measures now. On this
point, a report by a national commission in Israel, known as the Landau
Commission Report, explored in Part VI.B, determined that it may be
justifiable to employ torture to discover the location of a bomb, whether
it is set to explode in five minutes or five days.123
3.

The Causal Nexus Factor

Under this factor, the action taken must be reasonably calculated to
be causally effective in averting the greater evil. Bentham posed the
causal nexus factor this way: “Even on occasions which admit not of
delay, [torture] ought not to be employed but in Cases where the benefit
produced by the doing of the thing required is such as can warrant the

Bob Drogin and Greg Miller, Spy Agencies Facing Questions of Tactics, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
28, 2001, § 1, at 1 (internal quotations omitted).
122
Twining & Twining, supra note 8, at 313.
123
See Mordecai Kremnitzer, The Landau Commission Report—Was the Security Service
Subordinated to the Law, or the Law to the ”Needs” of the Security Service?, 23 ISR. L. REV. 216,
253 (1989).
121
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employing of so extreme a remedy.”124 If there is a minimal likelihood of
success from torture and less intrusive, lawful investigative techniques
are available, then the utility of torture under the necessity doctrine
cannot be sustained.
A consideration under this factor is whether the suspect has it in his
power to provide the desired information. To some extent, this overlaps
with the choice-of-evils factor where this Article suggests considering the
degree of certainty that authorities believe that the suspect has the
needed information in assessing whether torture is the lesser evil. If the
suspect admits to planting the bomb, but refuses to disclose its location,
that would seem to be a pretty high level of certainty that the suspect has
it in his power to disclose the relevant information. But if authorities
have a mere suspicion without a lot to back it up, we have an entirely
different situation.
On this point, Jeremy Bentham said:
There seem to be two Cases in which Torture may with
propriety be applied.
1. The first is where the thing which a Man is required to
do being a thing which the public has an interest in his
doing, is a thing which for a certainty is in his power to
do; and which therefore so long as he continues to suffer
for not doing he is sure not to be innocent.
2. The second is where a man is required what probably
though not certainly it is in his power to do; and for the
not doing of which it is possible that he may suffer,
although he be innocent; but which the public has so
great an interest in his doing that the danger of what
may ensue from his not doing it is a greater danger than
even that of an innocent person’s suffering the greatest
degree of pain that can be suffered by Torture, of the
kind and in the quantity permitted to be employed.125

124
125

Twining & Twining, supra note 8, at 313.
Id. at 312-13.
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Bentham goes on to say that torture “ought not to be employed without
good proof of its being in the power of the prisoner to do what is
required of him.”126
There is a difference of opinion as to the causal efficacy of torture,
even if the suspect has the necessary information. The pain and stress of
torture make it almost impossible for an ordinary individual to endure
without caving in to the interrogators. Much depends on the degree of
torture, ranging from discomfort to ill treatment to intolerable pain.
Each person has his own pain threshold, his own psychological makeup, and his own cultural conditioning. Of course, history is replete with
instances of victims who would not be broken under the threat of or
actual use of torture. One notable example consists of the individuals
who, during the second and third centuries, were persecuted and
tortured to death for refusing to renounce Christianity.127 What if the
suspect, once subjected to torture, does not capitulate? If the torture fails
to be causally effective in getting the crucial information, would it be
appropriate to go one step beyond—to take a child of the suspect and
torture him or her in front of the suspect?
Another concern related to the causal nexus factor is whether
information gained through torture is reliable. One objection to torture
is that torture is inefficient; it produces false confessions and wrong
information. If torture is ineffective in gaining accurate information,
then the causal connection between torture and averting a greater evil is
gone. Many believe that torture tactics often raise such reliability
questions.128 A spokesman for Human Rights Watch has said that
torture in the United States is uncommon because it lacks causal efficacy.
“Law enforcement professionals in this country understand that torture
is a wonderful technique for getting confessions from innocent people

See id. at 313.
See, e.g., ELAINE PAGELS, THE GNOSTIC GOSPELS 70-101 (1979).
128
See Strauss, supra note 4, at 261-65 (numerous torture opponents have argued that
torture seldom works); see, e.g., Philip B. Heymann, Torture Should Not Be Authorized,
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 16, 2002, at A15 (“Torture is a prescription for losing a war for support
of our beliefs in the hope of reducing the casualties from relatively small battles.”); Peter
Maass, Torture, Tough or Lite: If a Terror Suspect Won’t Talk, Should He Be Made To?, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 9, 2003, at D4 (“[M]any terrorism experts believe that in the long run torture is
a losing strategy.”); Alisa Solomon, The Case Against Torture, VILLAGE VOICE, Dec. 4, 2001, at
56 (citing a CIA training manual and a study of Argentina’s dirty war for the proposition
that torture is ineffective).
126
127
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and a lousy technique for getting truth out of guilty people.”129 It seems
intuitive that most people subjected to torture will say virtually anything
to stop the pain.
Long-term inefficiencies of torture have been noted with the British
experience in Ireland and the French experience in Algeria.130 In Algeria,
for example, while the French military defeated terrorists in the Battle of
Algiers through the widespread use of torture, such resentment was
engendered that there was great difficulty in establishing peace
thereafter.131
Others have argued that torture simply does not work in most cases.
An individual subject to extreme physical and mental abuse will talk, but
what they say will not be reliable. A person will say anything in these
circumstances, but not necessarily the truth.132 Even the CIA has
acknowledged that torture is not effective in ferreting out the truth.133
On the other hand, many think torture is in fact reliable, as
“[h]umans have an intense desire to avoid pain,” and thus will “comply
with the demands of a torturer to avoid the pain.” 134 Some think that
the use of torture has successfully coerced Palestinian terrorists into
revealing information that has directly prevented further acts of
terrorism.135 In 1995, Filipino authorities used torture and obtained
information that enabled them to thwart the hijacking and destruction of
eleven airliners.136 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court of Israel, in its
opinion that disallowed the use of torture of terrorism suspects,
Eric Schmitt, There Are Ways To Make Them Talk, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2002, § 4, at 1
(quoting Tom Malinowski, Human Rights Watch spokesman) (internal quotations
omitted).
130
See id.
131
See id.
132
Strauss, supra note 4, at 261.
133
See Tim Werner, CIA Taught, Then Dropped Mental Torture in Latin America, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 29, 1997, at A1.
134
Bagaric & Clarke, supra note 2, at 588-89.
The main benefit of torture is that it is an excellent means of gathering
information. Humans have an intense desire to avoid pain, no matter
how short term, and most will comply with the demands of a torturer
to avoid the pain. Often the threat of torture alone will evoke
cooperation.
Id.
135
See Cohen, supra note 114, at 90.
136
See Matthew Brzezinski, Bust and Boom: Six Years Before September 11 Attacks, Philippine
Police Took Down an al Qaeda Cell that Had Been Plotting, Among Other Things, To Fly
Explosives-Laden Planes into the Pentagon—and Possibly Some Skyscrapers, WASH. POST, Dec.
30, 2001, at W09.
129
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discussed in Part VI.B, said that the severe shaking of suspected
terrorists by the Israeli General Security Services cannot be prohibited
“without seriously harming the GSS’ ability to effectively thwart deadly
terrorist attacks. Its use in the past has lead to the thwarting of
murderous attacks.”137
Similarly, a senior Pentagon civilian lawyer stated that intense
interrogation techniques were necessary with respect to a Saudi Arabian
detainee who was believed to be the planned twentieth hijacker in the
September 11 terrorist plot. The situation was one of “some urgency” in
that he likely “had information that the people at Guantanamo believed
was important, not just about perhaps 9/11, but about future events.”138
This particular detainee ended up providing information about a
planned attack and about financial networks to fund terrorist
operations.139
Is it worth the risk that false information will be elicited by the
tortured subject? Given the potential unreliability of information
obtained from torture, the worst that could happen is that the inevitable
conflagration will still happen despite law enforcement’s best efforts to
secure needed information. But because torture has worked at times in
the past, there will ultimately be similar successes in the future.140
4.

The Legal Way Out Factor

This factor requires a showing that there is no reasonable legal
alternative to avert the greater evil. In order for torture to pass scrutiny
under the necessity doctrine, other reasonable alternatives would need to
be deployed, if time permits. The legal way out factor is associated with
the imminence factor—that is, if the necessitous circumstance is truly
imminent, there may be no time in which to pursue legal alternatives.
137
The case is reported as The Public Committee Against Torture in H.C. 5100/94, Israel
v. Israel, [1999]. See Supreme Court of Israel: Judgment Concerning the Legality of the General
Security Service’s Interrogation Methods, 38 I.L.M. 1471, 1475 (1999) [hereinafter GSS Torture
Case].
138
See David Johnston & Thom Shanker, Pentagon Approved Intense Interrogation
Techniques for Sept. 11 Suspect at Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2004, at A10 (internal
quotations omitted).
139
See id.
140
Strauss, supra note 4, at 263. For example, Jordan broke the famous terrorist Abu
Nidel by threatening his family. Id. at n.212. The Philippines reportedly cracked the 1993
World Trade Center bombings by convincing a suspect that they would turn him over to
the Israelis. Id. And in 1995, the Philippines state police turned the testicles, and broke the
ribs of one al Qaeda agent who, after two weeks, was broken and revealed a plot to hijack
eleven aircraft. Id.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss4/6

Cohan: Torture and the Necessity Doctrine

2007]

Torture and the Necessity Doctrine

1621

However, if the danger is not imminent, Bentham suggests that “a
method of compulsion apparently less severe and therefore less
unpopular ought to be employed in preference.”141 Obviously, if the
danger to be averted is so imminent that there is no time to explore less
intrusive techniques, interrogators may determine that torture is, under
the circumstances, the only reasonable means of averting the greater evil.
Alternatives, such as offering a bribe, other incentives, or
psychological strategies might also be considered. Interrogators might
consider the less painful alternative of injecting the suspect with “truth
serum.”142 The use of truth serum or other mind-altering substances
may well be legal under United States law, unless the use of the
substance produces “prolonged mental harm.”143 In any event, “a
significant number of subjects retain the ability to dissemble while under
the influence of truth serum” and these substances cannot ensure the
accuracy of the information obtained.144 Other commentators also argue
against the causal efficacy of truth serum, saying that while drugs make
suspects chatty, there is more evidence that they are simply “chirruping
on” rather than telling the truth and that there is lack of scientific
evidence of the reliability of confessions elicited under so-called truth
serum.145 Still, the use of truth serum lacks the painfulness and, under
the United States interpretation of the U.N. Convention, it is a permitted
technique. Short of torture, “[w]here the stakes are sufficiently high, and
where other methods have proven unsuccessful, even a relatively
modest chance of discovering useful information might very well be

Twining & Twining, supra note 8, at 313.
See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 322 (1963). The drug, hyoscine, as well as the
drug, scopolamine, are familiarly known as “truth serum.” Id.
143
As mentioned in Part III.D, the definition of torture under 18 U.S.C. § 2340(2), the
infliction of “severe mental pain or suffering,” requires that it be “prolonged” in duration,
and the definition explicitly prohibits “the administration or application, or threatened
administration or application, of mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated
to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality . . . .”
For an argument that the use of truth serum cannot be considered “prolonged mental
harm,” and therefore cannot be construed as torture, see Odeshoo, supra note 2, at 201. The
author concludes that “neither international law nor U.S. law categorically bars the United
States from using truth serum for intelligence-gathering purposes in its efforts to combat
terrorism.” Id. at 253. However, another commentator argues that torture should
encompass the mental harm caused by truth serum used for the purpose of coercing the
divulgence of information. See generally Keller, supra note 2, at 521.
144
Odeshoo, supra note 2, at 215.
145
See Strauss, supra note 4, at 262 n.209.
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regarded as sufficient to justify the use of such interrogation methods,”
including for example, truth serum.146
As mentioned in Part IV.C, Dershowitz asserts that if a suspect is
given immunity from prosecution, then the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination does not prohibit the use of truth serum or
even torture. Thus, if the use of truth serum to interrogate a suspect
does not violate substantive due process rights, this could be a
reasonable legal alternative to torture. The evidence may not be used in
court, but the suspect’s civil rights might not be considered to be
violated—in contrast with straightforward, physical torture.147 That is
perhaps because the injection of truth serum is minimally invasive,
involves almost no pain or deleterious side effects, and simply lowers a
person’s inhibitions.148 If this reasonable legal alternative does not result
in information sought, then the interrogation may have no other course
but to proceed with torture.
5.

The Preemption Factor

One might argue that the necessity doctrine is unavailable because
the issue of the use of torture has been settled by a deliberate legislative
choice in the international community, evidenced by the various
conventions mentioned above that make torture illegal under any
circumstances. This deontological principle, being part of customary
international law, is in effect a deliberate legislative determination that
preempts the matter. The fact that numerous states, both signators and
nonsignators to these conventions, violate this norm does not detract
from the deontological language of these conventions any more than the
fact that some people commit murder suggests that the law of homicide
“admits” of some exceptions. The situation seems to be much the same
as the “preemption” indicated in cases that have disallowed the
necessity defense in the context of intentional homicide, even though the
act saved a greater number of lives.149 Inasmuch as the torture
conventions specifically state that war or other exigencies offer no
justification for torture, it appears that the issue has been “preempted”
Odeshoo, supra note 2, at 216.
See Strauss, supra note 4, at 237. It has been suggested that the use of truth serum
might require, under the Fourth Amendment, that police obtain a search warrant based
upon probable cause to believe the individual has relevant information important for
averting a terrorist plot. See id. at 238 n.133.
148
See id. at 238.
149
See R.I. Recreation Center, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 177 F.2d 603, 605 (1st Cir.
1949); United States v. Holmes, 26 Fed. Cas. 360 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842) (Case No. 15,383);
Regina v. Dudley & Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273, 286 (1884).
146
147
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by statutes that address the subject. Under the preemption notion of the
necessity defense, it seems that this factor precludes justifying the use of
torture under any circumstances.
It seems likely that if officials are faced with a ticking bomb case,
they will engage in torture knowing full well it is considered to be a
deontological constraint under international law, with the only question
being whether it will be done openly, pursuant to some legal protocol if
one is in place, or in a clandestine manner. A former CIA agent with
thirty years of experience stated, “A lot of people are saying we need
someone at the agency who can pull fingernails out. Others are saying,
Let others use interrogation methods that we don’t use. The only
question then is, do you want to have CIA people in the room?”150 The
preemption factor is probably the most important hurdle for one to
overcome in connection with arguing that necessity is a justification or
excuse for torture in certain exigent circumstances.
6.

The Clean Hands Factor

The clean hands factor seems intuitive: if the actor has in some way
been responsible for bringing about the necessitous circumstances, the
necessity defense may not be interposed. A blameworthy actor ought
not be able to invoke necessity if he recklessly assumed the risk of a
terrible predicament in which a choice-of-evils might develop. Suppose
someone is speeding down a narrow alley. Suddenly he sees a group of
people; it is too late to stop. He can avoid killing them if he veers into an
adjacent shop, where a shopkeeper is rearranging a window display.
The driver turns his car into the shop window, killing the owner, but
thereby saves the lives of the group of people ahead. He defends a
charge of vehicular homicide by pleading necessity in that he made a
reasonable choice-of-evils and, if he had not driven into the shop, he
would have killed many more people. While we may approve of his
quick thinking that resulted in killing one person in the shop instead of
the five in the alley, it still seems counterintuitive for a defendant to be
acquitted for vehicular manslaughter based on necessity where his
overall recklessness caused the circumstances that occasioned the choiceof-evils. Intuitively, the defense seems wrong in such a case because it
was the defendant’s recklessness that established the Hobson’s choice in

150
DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS, supra note 53, at 151 (quoting an unnamed CIA
agent) (internal quotations omitted).
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the first place.151 The choice-of-evils might mitigate the sentence, but not
acquit the actor from the crime.
To cite another example, suppose someone negligently starts a brush
fire and, in order to prevent it from spreading to a town, he destroys
someone’s house to clear the way for a firebreak. It seems intuitive that
the actor ought not be able to defend an action in tort for damages to the
structure he destroyed, even though he did succeed in preventing the
fire from spreading to an area where it would have produced greater
harm.
Many terrorists operate under the belief that they have “clean
hands”—that is, that they are not responsible for bringing about the state
of affairs that have pushed them to launch attacks on us. They believe
that they are truly innocent of any wrongdoing—that the evil to be
averted is wholly outside of themselves—such things as imperialism,
hegemony, imposition of Western values, etc. Terrorists may perceive
that they are faced with a significant form of injustice or oppression by a
powerful political enemy, that an act of terrorism is necessary to avert
this harm because there is no other remedy, and that the act would be,
on balance, the lesser evil. Furthermore, to a terrorist, there is no such
thing as an “innocent target” in the enemy population, and thus civilians
and other “innocent” targets are fair game against the offending
government. From the terrorist’s perspective, the targets are not truly
innocent, but are collectively guilty of their government’s policies.
Terrorists may believe that they are not the initial aggressors, but that the
enemy government’s imperialism constitutes unlawful violence and
aggression against their fundamental rights, and that terrorist action is
the only reasonable means of fending off the offending government and
overcoming tyranny.
According to R.M. Hare, terrorists are “acting on behalf of an
oppressed section of the population which has absolutely no alternative
means of securing redress of its just grievances. Such people might claim
that they were prepared to have anybody do the same to them in a like
case.”152 As Hare points out, however, the question is what counts as
“just grievances.”153 Specifically, it will be necessary to show that there
were no other feasible means for the resolution of grievances.154 Thus, to
151

Leo Katz, ILL-GOTTEN GAINS: EVASION, BLACKMAIL, FRAUD, AND KINDRED PUZZLES OF
42 (1996).
R.M. Hare, On Terrorism, 13 J. VALUE INQUIRY 241, 244 (1979).
Id. at 244-45.
Id.
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terrorists, the clean hands factor is fully complied with—they have clean
hands, and thus they are not the source of the evil that they seek to
eradicate.
The various elements of the necessity defense make it extremely
difficult for authorities to justify or excuse the use of torture, even when
extremely exigent circumstances exist. That does not mean that
authorities would refrain from the use of torture in a ticking bomb
situation. Still, the international consensus that torture is wrong appears
to have risen to the status of customary international law. Thus, it would
apply to all state actors, and “necessity” would not be a justification or
excuse for its violation. In the final analysis, states will take such action
as they deem necessary, where exigent circumstances exist that under
ordinarily would not be considered.
VI. MODERN INSTANCES OF TORTURE BY THE FRENCH AND THE ISRAELIS
A. The French Experience in the Use of Torture Against the Algerians
Application of the necessity doctrine in the context of torture is a
reality. Not surprisingly, occasions arise where interrogators are
tempted to use torture as a lesser evil in an effort to avert a greater evil—
future terrorist acts.
A well known example of the extensive use of torture was by the
French army during its brutal anti-colonial war in Algeria from 1955 to
1957. An estimated one million Algerians were killed in their anticolonial struggle against France.155 During that period, the French
committed more than half a million troops to repress the Algerian
rebellion.156 The army was left more or less to its own devices and
torture and other atrocities became widespread.157 Some of the torture
consisted of applying electrodes to various parts of the body and
wrapping a wet towel around the person’s face until they choked and
vomited.158
French soldiers also committed many rapes of Algerian women.
Some tens of thousands of Algerians who fought on the side of the
French during the war were later abandoned by the French and

See Richard Deaton, Western Colonial Terrorism Makes bin Laden Look Tame, THE
OTTAWA CITIZEN, Dec. 10, 2001, at A13.
156
Id.
157
Id.
158
See 60 Minutes Transcript, 34 BURRELL’S INFO. SERV. PUB., Jan. 20, 2002, at 6-7.
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massacred when the French pulled out. France never apologized for its
conduct in the war,159 and in 2000, the French Prime Minister, Lionel
Jospin, ruled out a parliamentary inquiry into the torture committed by
the French army during the Algerian war.160 An officer who supervised
the torture, General Paul Aussaresses, wrote a memoir, Algeria Special
Services 1955-1957, narrating his cold-blooded use of torture and how he
summarily executed twenty-four men.161 In the book, the General gives
chilling details about how and why he tortured prisoners and says that
almost all who were interrogated were killed, whether or not they
talked.162 No one was tried for war crimes in connection with this
matter. However, once the General’s book came out in France, he was
prosecuted, not for his acts of supervising torture, but under an obscure
French law that made it a crime to try and justify war, which the
prosecutor argued was evidenced by the General seeking to reveal the
facts of the episode to the public.163 The General was fined $6,500.164
The trial focused almost exclusively on passages singled out from
the General’s memoir.165 In a passage of his book quoted in court, the
General wrote, “‘The best way to make a terrorist talk when he refused
to say what he knew was to torture him.’ ‘I was indifferent. They had to
be killed; that’s all there was to it.’”166 In addition, the General said in
court, “‘Alas, torture does serve a purpose. And today I would do the
same thing again if I had a bin Laden in my hands’ . . . ”167 The General,
age 83 at the time of trial, testified that the acts of torture were necessary
to obtain information fast and to save lives.168
B. The Israeli Experience in the Use of Torture Against Palestinians
For a number of years, Israel’s General Security Service (“the GSS”)
routinely employed coercive interrogation methods towards Palestinians
159
See Suzanne Daley, France Is Seeking a Fine in Trial of Algerian War General, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 29, 2001, at A6 [hereinafter Daley, France Is Seeking a Fine].
160
See Susan Bell, France Rejects Inquiry over Algerian War Torture, THE SCOTSMAN, Nov.
27, 2000.
161
Id.
162
See Robert Graham, Confession of a Torturer Open Scars of Algerian War, FIN. TIMES
(LONDON), May 5, 2001, at 6.
163
Daley, France Is Seeking a Fine, supra note 159, at A6.
164
See Suzanne Daley, France Fines General, 83, for Memoir Justifying Algerian War, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 26, 2002, at A4.
165
Id.
166
Daley, France Is Seeking a Fine, supra note 159, at A6.
167
See Harry de Quetteville, General Who Justified War Crimes Fined, THE DAILY
TELEGRAPH (LONDON), Jan. 26, 2002, at 18.
168
Daley, France Is Seeking a Fine , supra note 159, at A6.
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suspected of involvement in or having knowledge of terrorist activity.169
Under the GSS interrogation tactics, “untold numbers of Palestinians
have been subjected to systematic torture, often resulting in permanent
physical and psychological trauma and, on occasion, even death.”170
For many years the GSS denied that it used coercive interrogation
techniques.171 The techniques consisted of prolonged isolation of
detainees in harsh conditions, sleep deprivation, shackling detainees in
painful positions for long periods, usually covering their heads with sack
cloth, making it difficult to breathe, playing loud music non-stop,
beating and shaking detainees, and making various threats relating to
the detainees and their families.172 These interrogation techniques
became public knowledge in 1987 with the publication of a report by a
national commission of inquiry on the GSS interrogation methods,
known as the Landau Commission Report.173 The Israeli government
established the Landau Commission, headed by a retired Israeli Supreme
Court justice, to examine the dilemma of how a democratic society
should respond to the prospect of using nonlethal torture in cases where
there is the vital need to preserve the very existence of the State and its
citizens and maintain fundamental principles of law.
The Landau Commission Report said that the physical pressure used
by the GSS against Palestinian detainees was “‘largely to be defended,
both morally and legally.’”174 The Report, in effect, expressly authorized
the GSS to use physical and psychological force on individuals suspected
of being involved in “political subversion.”175 In fact, the Commission
outlined what “physical methods” of interrogation were permissible,
making it clear that the “rule of law” required that these methods be
employed within strict guidelines, never to be exercised
“disproportionately.”176 The Commission also concluded that the
169
See Mordechai Kremnitzer & Re’em Segev, The Legality of Interrogational Torture: A
Question of Proper Authorization or a Substantive Moral Issue?, 34 ISR. L. REV. 509, 501 (2000).
170
Ardi Imseis, “Moderate” Torture On Trial: Critical Reflections on the Israeli Supreme Court
Judgment Concerning the Legality of General Security Service Interrogation Methods, 19
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 328, 329 (2001).
171
See Kremnitzer & Segev, supra note 169, at 512.
172
See id. at 511. The Landau Commission Report is formally known as the Report of the
Commission of Inquiry in the Matters of Investigation Methods of the General Security Service
Regarding Hostile Terrorist Activity, 23 Isr. L. Rev. 146, 146-88 (1987) [hereinafter Landau
Commission Report] (excerpts of the Report were translated into English).
173
See Kremnitzer & Segev, supra note 169, at 512.
174
See Imseis, supra note 170, at 334 (quoting from the Landau Commission Report, supra
note 169, at ¶ 2.18).
175
See id. at 336 (emphasis omitted).
176
Landau Commission Report, supra note 172, ¶ 3.16.
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necessity defense was available to GSS interrogators, should any of them
be prosecuted.177
However, the Commission refrained from commenting on whether
the physical interrogation methods constituted torture. But in a
classified appendix to the Landau Commission Report, the contents of
which still have not been disclosed to the public, the Commission set
forth specific guidelines concerning the conditions and limits for using
coercive interrogation methods.178 Thereafter, the GSS continued to
employ coercive interrogation techniques against Palestinians and
frequently went beyond what was allowed in the Commission’s
guidelines.179
Despite hundreds of petitions by detainees to Israel’s Supreme
Court, claiming that the GSS was employing illegal interrogation
techniques, the Israeli courts routinely refused to interfere in the use of
these harsh methods of interrogation on various procedural pretexts,
including that the claims made were too general and did not concern a
specific instance, or that the applicant’s interrogation had been
completed by the time of the hearing, and hence the question was
moot.180 This changed in 1999 when the Israeli Supreme Court held that
while there might be a moral necessity for using exceptional
interrogation techniques in order to save lives and, while the necessity
defense is embodied in Israeli law, the government was not authorized
to use such means in the absence of explicit legislation to that effect.181 In
particular, the court emphasized, “violence directed at a suspect’s body
or spirit does not constitute a reasonable investigation practice[,]” and
that “a reasonable investigation is necessarily one free of torture.”182
This decision apparently contradicted the Landau Commission’s
finding that the GSS was authorized to use exceptional interrogation
techniques. The court held that the GSS interrogation techniques
constituted torture or was cruel, unhuman, or degrading treatment, that
the law prohibits the use of “‘brutal or inhuman means’ in the course of
an investigation” and that Israel is a signatory to various international
law treaties, which prohibit the use of torture, cruel, inhuman, or

177
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180
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degrading treatment.183 These prohibitions are “absolute,” and admit of
no exceptions, according to the court.184 The court considered Israel’s
statutory law of necessity, which has two “imminence” requirements.185
First, there must be an immediate need to commit the unlawful act and,
second, the danger to be averted must also be imminent.186 It is hard to
understand why the statute is so written, for in practically any situation
the need to act immediately is based on the fact that the danger to be
averted is itself imminent.
Construing this provision, the court
determined that the necessity defense
might arise in instances of “ticking bombs,” and that the
immediate need [requirement] . . . refers to the imminent
nature of the act rather than that of the danger. Hence,
the imminence criteria is satisfied even if the bomb is set
to explode in a few days, or perhaps even after a few
weeks, provided the danger is certain to materialize and
there is no alternative means of preventing its
materialization. In other words, there exists a concrete
level of imminent danger of the explosion’s occurrence
(references omitted).187
Thus, the court indicated that in analyzing the necessity defense, the
justification in using coercive interrogation techniques could apply even
if the danger to be averted will not occur until after a few weeks.188 In
such a situation, it is hard to understand how the interrogator would be
justified in using coercive interrogation techniques immediately. There
is plenty of time, it would seem, to obtain the relevant information from
the suspect by the use of legal alternatives.
One can imagine some cases where the need to take action may be
immediately necessary, even though the danger to be averted may be

See id.
See id.
185
See id. at 522.
A person shall bear no criminal liability for committing an act
immediately necessary for the purpose of saving the life, liberty, body
or property, of either himself or another person, from tangible danger
of serious harm, imminent from the particular state of affairs, at the
requisite time, and absent alternative means for avoiding the harm.
Id. (quoting Penal Act 1977, art. 34k (Isr)).
186
Id.
187
See id. at 523 (quoting HCJ 5100/94 The Public Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. The
State of Israel [1999] IsrSC 53(4) PD 817 § 33).
188
Id.
183
184

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 4 [2007], Art. 6

1630 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

remote in time. Suppose a detainee has set off a timed nuclear bomb.
The bomb will detonate in two weeks in the middle of a populated
center and, even if people are evacuated, there will be great destruction
to property and cultural monuments and grave environmental damage.
But the detainee has hidden a switch which, if activated within one week
before the bomb is scheduled to go off, will stop it. He confesses that the
switch is so well hidden in an underground cave that it would take days
for workers to locate it. Thus, in such a situation, there would be an
imminent need to apply coercive interrogation techniques here and now,
even though the particular danger to be avoided will not occur for two
weeks.
The Israeli government argued that, based on the Landau Commission
Report, an act that meets the necessity defense is a choice of a lesser evil
and, as such, is not only permissible, but also constitutes a moral duty.189
As the GSS interrogators are responsible for the protection of the public,
they are justified in employing coercive measures as part of
interrogations when the necessity defense conditions are met.190 The
court noted that “in the appropriate circumstances, GSS investigators
may avail themselves of the ‘necessity’ defense, if criminally indicted[,]”
but that the doctrine of necessity does not afford interrogators the
general authority, ab initia, to use improper interrogation methods.191
The decision seems to contradict the Landau Commission’s finding that
coercive techniques were lawful and within the scope of GSS
investigative power.
The Israeli Supreme Court also said that it would be up to the
legislative branch to enact laws to grant affirmative powers to the
authorities to utilize coercive interrogation methods.192 The problem
here, from the standpoint of the security police, is that they put
themselves in jeopardy in that they could be prosecuted for their actions,
and their only recourse would be to take their chances and offer the
doctrine of necessity as a defense to possible charges.
After the GSS torture case decision was handed down, it was
reported that GSS interrogators designated many dozens of ticking bomb
GSS Torture Case, supra note 137.
Id.
191
Id.
192
Id. Clearly, a legal statutory provision is necessary for the purpose of authorizing the
government to instruct in the use of physical means during the course of an interrogation,
beyond what is permitted by the ordinary “law of investigation,” and in order to provide
the individual GSS investigator with the authority to employ these methods. Id.
189
190
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detainees on whom exceptional interrogation techniques were used and
justified under the necessity doctrine.193 In addition, the GSS continued
to routinely use sleep deprivation, prolonged shackling in painful
situations, and beatings (but apparently stopped using violent shaking
and covering detainees’ heads with sacks).194
VII. CONCLUSION
In The City of God, St. Augustine stated that torture is “a thing,
indeed, to be bewailed, and, if that were possible, watered with
fountains of tears.”195 However, it seems implausible that any right
could be couched in absolutist terms. Not even the right to life is
absolute: self-defense, for instance, is a justification for the intentional
killing of another human being. The blanket prohibition on torture fails
to convince governments to refrain from the practice, and some
governments have explicitly codified the necessity doctrine in connection
with torture.196
The conclusion of this Article is that the way to handle torture in an
extreme emergency is to recognize that, while torture is prohibited,
necessity provides an overriding justification under the circumstances.
One commentator has offered:
[I]t seems strange to argue that people’s moral
compasses will truly be damaged if torture is prohibited
99.9% of the time rather than 100%. . . . [T]he state can
accord great respect to human rights while still
acknowledging that, just as it is sometimes necessary to
deprive people of their freedom (imprison them) in
order to protect the public, sometimes it is necessary to
physically hurt people to protect the public. Just
because certain human rights norms are not absolute
priorities of the state does not mean that the state has
entirely lost respect for them.197

See Kremnitzer & Segev, supra note 169, at 531.
See id.
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ST. AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD, bk. XIX, ch. 6 (1950).
196
Great Britain has explicitly codified a necessity justification for torture—Article 134(4)
of the Criminal Justice Act of 1988, which states that acting under “lawful authority,
justification or excuse” is a defense against prosecution for torture. See Criminal Justice
Act, 1988, c. 33, § 134(4) (Eng.).
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Raviv, supra note 2, at 144-45.
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Thus, under the necessity doctrine, torture would be permissible (or
even justifiable) if the circumstances are so extreme that there would be a
significant “utilitarian” advantage to the action. In the ticking bomb
situation, the advantage is extremely high, considering the number of
lives to be saved compared to the (one) person tortured. Of course, there
is always the possibility of getting false information from the tortured
individual. Also, it has been pointed out that torture is not death—the
victim survives, albeit with the memory of the painful episode. The
terrorist will not be killed, but will be “merely” subjected to a highly
painful assault of his body.
On the other hand, there is the slippery slope concern that, once
torture is justified in certain circumstances, authorities—and world
standards—will gradually slide down so that torture might even become
a norm. We actually see this is the case today in certain countries,
including Egypt and Syria, where torture is known to be deployed on a
fairly routine basis in numerous situations.
It is hard to say, from a legal theory standpoint, that the necessity
doctrine is “correct” for practically every conceivable felony as well as
civil wrongs, but that it may not be invoked in cases of torture. That
would be theoretically and analytically improper. However, as we have
seen, the pre-emption factor may well “trump” the situation. For if there
is a deontological constraint that has taken on a certain weight of
authority, as is the case in the prohibition against torture, then there is no
exception to the rule (not even necessity).
This discussion is of practical importance because we live in a world
where terrorism—however you wish to define it—is a prevalent and
persistent feature of life. But we live in an era where a number of
nations entertain torture not only of terrorists, but of all manner of
prisoners under circumstances that are a far cry from meeting the criteria
of the necessity doctrine. Again, the necessity doctrine is largely of
utilitarian value, so that there is hardly unanimity as to its moral
soundness. Yet the prospect of saving many lives that would otherwise
be lost is morally appealing.
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